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Introduction
International democracy promotion has always been contentious – today perhaps more than
ever. Examples from the European neighborhood testify to this: analysts argue that democracy
promotion is one of the key reasons for the worsening of relations between Russia and the
West after 2011. The successive achievements of externally promoted so-called ‘color revolutions’
(in Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004) rattled Russian President Vladimir Putin, in
particular after the post-election anti-government protests in Russia in 2011-2012. Putin viewed
these protests as a direct threat to the current Russian political system and, importantly, as
orchestrated from the West (McFaul, 2014). In 2014 he stated that “we see what tragic
consequences the wave of so-called color revolutions led to. For us this is a lesson and a warning.
We should do everything necessary so that nothing similar ever happens in Russia” (cited in
Korsunskaya, 2014). A second example comes from the Southern Mediterranean: after the Arab
uprisings Europe was roundly criticized for its lip service to democracy in the region. In fact, the
European Union (EU) had combined democracy assistance programs with solid support for
authoritarian leaders such as Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and Mohammed VI of
Morocco (Hollies, 2012). Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), admitted as much: “We must show humility about the past. Europe
was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region,” he
stressed in early 2011, adding that Europe should be standing with pro-democracy demonstrators
and not “dictators” killing their citizens (Füle, 2011).
Given such controversies, it is not surprising that democracy promotion has received extensive
attention in the academic literature. Before focusing on the specific topic of EU democracy
promotion in the Southern Mediterranean, it is important to have a clear understanding of what
democracy promotion is and of the EU as a democracy promoter generally.
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2What is Democracy Promotion?
Democracy promotion is here taken to include positive and negative democratic conditionalities, and
democracy assistance. Positive and negative democratic conditionalities are carrots such as
increased aid, closer economic ties, etc., on the one hand, and sanctions of various kinds, on the
other. The most powerful positive conditionality in the European context was (and to a certain extent
still is) the prospect of EU membership. This prospect is, however, missing in the southern
neighborhood, with the possible exception of Turkey. A potential negative conditionality is the so-
called ‘essential elements clause’, which since 1995 has been systematically included in
cooperation agreements between the EU and third countries. Such clauses state that the respect
for human rights and democratic principles constitutes an essential element of the agreement in
question (see EEAS Treaties Office, 2016). However, in practice, the possibility of suspending
cooperation on this basis has so far never been used in the Southern Mediterranean. Negative
conditionalities also include sanctions, such as travel bans, arms embargos and diplomatic sanctions.
Again, these are rare in cases of breaches of democratic rules generally.
Democracy assistance/aid is concrete aid programming mostly in the form of grants with the
strengthening of democratic norms, institutions and behavior as its main aim. It includes support for
elections, parliaments, political parties, and civil society. It encompasses aid aimed towards
strengthening the independence of the media and the judiciary, human rights, the public
administration and decentralization. Its perhaps most visible aspect is election monitoring, where the
European Commission (EC), in collaboration with the European Parliament, has been very active.
Drawing the boundaries of what should be classified as democracy assistance is not always straight-
forward. Does for instance support for NGOs that promote LGBT rights fall under democracy
promotion? A quick glance at the political and legal situation in the Western democratic “core” states
during the first four post-WWII decades suggests that this is not necessarily the case: these states
were considered consolidated democracies even though LGBT rights were at best patchily
respected. However, such support is now part and parcel of democracy promotion as defined by
governments. Likewise, decentralization is routinely included in democracy assistance programming.
However, for instance France started decentralizing only in the 1980s but was, needless to say,
classified as democratic long before that. For the EU, support for the battle to abolish the death
penalty is a core part of democracy assistance. However, unsurprisingly, this is not the case for the
other main democracy promoter globally, the US. This is a problem with what Schmitter and Brouwer
call a “predominantly ‘phenotypic’ definition of DPP based on stated actor intentions”, i.e. when aims
defined by democracy promoters are taken at face value (Schmitter & Brouwer, 1999, p. 12).1
1 This definition excludes covert assistance to topple undemocratic rulers. It also excludes economic and social aid
(aimed to ensure high levels of employment, growth and education for instance) even though its indirect effect may well
be to help stabilize democracy. Moreover, the definition leaves to the side so-called contagion/demonstration effects,
which have been much discussed in the academic literature. Although such effects are important in explaining how
democratic waves occur, there is no “promoter”, no agent, involved. Instead, the overthrow of one non-democratic regime
– quite unwittingly – inspires others: witness how the Tunisian uprising had ripple effects all the way to Bahrain.
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3The EU as a Democracy Promoter
The EU institutions are the second largest provider of democracy assistance globally, after the
US. US commitments of democracy aid have averaged approximately USD 3.4 billion yearly
over the 2012-17 period, while those of the EU institutions have amounted to some USD 2.7
billion (calculated from OECD, 2019). However, as EU officials routinely point out, the EU is the
largest donor if the democracy assistance of EU member states is added to that of the EU
institutions. Among EU states, the largest democracy aid donors are Germany, the UK, Sweden,
the Netherlands and Denmark. There is thus a clear North-South divide, with in particular France
and Italy rather unenthusiastic about the democracy promotion agenda, which they perceive as
poorly anchored in international law and potentially against national interests. This divide, as we
shall see, has some implications for EU support for democratization in the Southern
Mediterranean.
The EU institutions are present with democracy assistance projects across the globe. It is active
in all main areas of democracy aid as described above. Funding is given through a large number
of different instruments – both global thematic instruments such as the European Instrument
for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the European Endowment for Democracy
(EED)2 and through regional development funding envelopes, including the European
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance.
The EU as a Democracy Promoter in the Southern Mediterranean3
A long-standing goal of the EU neighborhood policy, further reinforced in the 2015 ENP review,
is to create a ring of stability and prosperity around the EU’s borders. The rhetoric has remained
constant: market economies and democracy brought stability to Europe and can have the same
effect in the neighborhood. In other words, the ultimate goal is stability, and democracy is seen
as one way of achieving this. This means that, in practice, the EU has supported democratic
change when it has been in line with its broader geopolitical aim of stability. Today, this has
meant that in the Southern Mediterranean, only Tunisia’s democratization is supported in a
relatively steadfast manner. In other countries, the Union’s stability aim militates against a
prioritization of profound democratic change. 
Tunisia is a more important exception than is perhaps always understood. Indeed, it is a real
novelty that the EU strongly and unequivocally supports democracy in a country in its southern
neighborhood – unlike in the East, where democracy has been a goal stretching back to the
Cold War. During the Cold War, rivalry in the Southern Mediterranean, unlike in Eastern Europe,
2 The EED is, strictly speaking, not an EU instrument, but an independent foundation. The vast majority of the funding
has so far been provided by the European Commission and EU member states, however.
3 This section is largely based on Khakee and Youngs (2018) and Khakee (2017).
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was not about promoting Western-style democracy. The most important East-West agreement
pertaining to civil and political rights of the time, the Helsinki Final Act, exemplifies this: its
Mediterranean dimension makes no mention of citizen rights. The geopolitical disinterest in
promoting democracy in the region continued after the end of the Cold War. European reactions
to the Algerian elections in 1991 and the Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections of 2006
are oft-cited examples, but there are others, such as King Hussein of Jordan’s failed attempt
to convince Western governments to re-open their aid coffers after the end of the Cold War by
holding the first elections in decades and introducing a liberalized media law (Kassaym, 2002).
The de facto EU preference for the authoritarian status quo – reinforced by the already
mentioned French and Italian resistance to the agenda – had an impact on the shape of
democracy assistance programs in the region before the Arab uprisings. As already mentioned,
negative conditionalities remained non-operational in practice; the same was true for positive
conditionalities. Democracy assistance projects largely focused on less central and less
contentious issues and the EU kept Islamist parties (including the most moderate) at arm’s
length, even though such parties held the key to their countries’ democratic future. Some of this
has changed with the Arab uprisings: there are some new mechanisms, most notably the EED,
and already existing instruments such as the EIDHR have received more funding. Priority has
been put on strengthening EU relations with civil society actors. In addition, some elements of
positive conditionalities (the so-called ‘more for more’ principle) have been introduced, even
though inconsistencies remain (Youngs, 2014, pp. 97-99). 
However, the tensions created through the juxtaposition of democracy assistance, on the one
hand, and support for the status quo, on the other, are still present in much of the region. The
effects of such half-hearted aid programming have increasingly been studied: the case of
Morocco is illuminating in this respect. The EU is quite satisfied with the status quo in Morocco,
as the King is an important economic partner and ally in containing terrorist threats and
migratory flows. Morocco is a hybrid regime, meaning, in a nutshell, that democratic elements
are inserted into an otherwise authoritarian system.4 In such a system, institutions usually
associated with democratic rule partially serve functions different from those they fulfill in a
democratic context. Thus, analysts have stressed that the Moroccan parliament, political parties
and civil society organizations (CSOs), for instance, help structure the monarchy’s negotiations
with various societal groups, thereby de facto playing a role in controlling and co-opting
important segments of society. What happens when such institutions are given democracy aid?
In recent years, analysts have stressed that insensitive strengthening of, for instance, political
parties and CSOs may lead to a strengthening of the hybrid regime in power, including in
Morocco. An example will serve to illustrate the argument (which, together with others, is
4 For a more detailed discussion of hybrid regimes, see Morlino, 2009.4
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discussed at greater length in Khakee [2107]): scholars such as Abdeslam Maghraoui and
Myriam Catusse have argued that the technical and a-political focus of international anti-
corruption measures has helped to obfuscate the deeper problem of corruption in Morocco,
which is tightly linked to the monarchy and the patronage networks underpinning monarchical
rule. Maghraoui notes that internationally supported anti-corruption efforts over a decade and
a half have been accompanied by a worsening of Morocco’s position on international corruption
indices. His explanation is that the monarchy has been able to use the technocratic emphasis
to shield another reality: that in recent years the royal family and the Makhzen have managed
to increase their role in the Moroccan economy by non-transparent means. Thus, the
internationally-sponsored legal changes, piecemeal administrative reform and the creation state
oversight mechanisms have gone hand in hand with a strengthening of the monarchy’s
domination over the Moroccan economy through not always fair economic maneuvers. Moreover,
the example thus set has not necessarily led to more probity across society.
Conclusion
The tensions built into much of the EU democracy promotion agenda in the Southern
Mediterranean are evident. They are also not unique: state interests of stability are ubiquitous
and not specific to the EU. Half-hearted programs in countries such as Morocco, as we saw in
this paper, run the risk of inadvertently strengthening the hybrid regime in place. The question
thus becomes: should states and the EU as ultimately representing states promote democracy?
Or should it be left to social movements, dissidents and committed citizens? Are there dangers
to the credibility of the democratic agenda as a whole when inconsistencies are evident and
numerous? What would be the trade-offs of abandoning democracy promotion in cases where
the quest for stability leads the EU to de facto support authoritarian rule? And what happens
if human rights and democratic values are entirely taken out of foreign policy? These are thorny
questions to which no easy answers can be found.
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